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DD/S&T# 3143 / 741

OEL-329-74

29 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Deputy Director for
Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Training of Analysts


REFERENCE: Memorandum for DD/S&T from [REDACTED]
EO/DD/M&S dated 14 August 1974
(DD/M&S 74-3109)

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1. Although the rather expanded charter proposed in reference gives no indication that the Office of Training currently intends to assume responsibility for technical training of OEL analysts, a word of caution appears in order. The advanced technical training required by OEL officers (specifically analysts) is extremely specialized and I firmly believe that the most practical solution is to continue to have OEL arrange this specialized training, coordinating with the Office of Training as appropriate.

2. The Office of Training should continue along the general guidelines they have followed in the past. We believe that such courses as Mid-Career, writing workshops, effective briefing, etc., are the types of courses that the Office of Training is staffed to appropriately handle. We find these courses extremely helpful to our officers and believe that they are essential to the career development of our people. In my view the Office of Training should concern itself with ways and means of improving the courses which they currently offer, or investigate the possibility of offering additional courses or training within established guidelines.

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ROBERT D. SINGEL
Director of ELINT
DD/S&T

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NPIC/D-247-74
27 August 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Comments on [REDACTED] Recommendations Re
Analyst Training

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1. I support the proposition that the Directorates should make officers available to OTR as instructors and seminar participants for both short and long periods, as needed. (Page 6, para, 15.b.)

2. I doubt that the suggested new Basic Skills course "Writing Intelligence Estimates" is appropriate, useful or necessary as a separate course. The DCI's approach to what we used to know as estimates is intended to introduce a flexibility of length, format, etc. to suit the particular situation and customer. A training course on writing estimates would influence analysts toward doing "estimates" in set ways not necessarily responsive to the needs of a given situation or customer. If any instruction of this kind is useful, it could be given as part of the course on "Writing Better Reports." (Page 4, para 10.)

3. I support the proposed extension of "mind-expanding" training programs. (Page 4.)

4. I support all the proposals for seminars. (Pages 4-5.)

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[REDACTED]
JOHN J. HICKS
Director

National Photographic Interpretation Center

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DD/OSAT# 3198/74

23 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DDS&T

SUBJECT : OWI Comments on Interim Report on
Analyst Training

1. In general, the [] recommendations for improving training of intelligence analysts are excellent. The "Mind-expanding Programs", and the various Seminars would be particularly beneficial for exposing analysts to the "big picture" and for the interchange derived from discussing capabilities, techniques, methodologies and -- perhaps most importantly -- needs, gaps and shortcomings. Our comments reflect our concern that resources be used effectively and that the proper balance exist between the production of intelligence and the training needed to improve the quality and responsiveness of what is produced.

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2. While we agree in principle with the recommendations and the methods for carrying them out we wonder what the impact will be on substantive capabilities and output if people are borrowed to staff the Institute. To achieve the training objectives it would be essential that the most knowledgeable and competent analysts be made available to the Institute. Thus they would be diverted from the production of intelligence. This would be a particular hardship at a time when reductions in staff personnel and increasing demands of intelligence require us to do more work with fewer people. Even short tours would create a resource strain because of the time required to prepare high quality course materials.

3. Similarly, the recommendation for more briefings would divert our resources. Again, it would be essential that the most knowledgeable and competent personnel do the briefing to insure both accuracy and the background needed to answer questions from the audience. The degree of resource diversion from substantive output, of course, would depend upon the number of briefings required. Nonetheless, it would be a drain on producer resources to prepare and present those briefings in addition to the briefings we normally give.

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
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SUBJECT: OWI Comments on Interim Report on Analyst Training

4. Finally, we question the stated assumption (listed in para 6a of TAB C) that: "the ultimate purpose of intelligence is to avoid war, or, if it comes, to be able to prevail." Perhaps a better statement would be: The ultimate purpose of intelligence is to present, as objectively as possible, factors -- particularly military factors -- that threaten the security of the United States or could impinge upon National Objectives.

These
will be
a problem


for R. E. HINEMAN
Acting Director
Weapons Intelligence

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28 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate for Science
and Technology

SUBJECT: Comments on [] Report on
Analyst Training

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1. [] make quite a pitch for more interdisciplinary interaction in the Agency's approach to intelligence and in its training programs which I think fits well with the "one Agency" concept. I agree with this idea but would point out the enormous difficulties in going from a statement of a principle to getting something done about it. In our own recent experience we have seen DDI-DDS&T joint production efforts (even though guided at the ADD level) fizzle out and it is an uphill struggle to establish true interaction between OSI and OER in the CTA area despite good personal relations at the management levels. My own feeling is that training programs are not the only, or the best, way to make a dent on the problem and that organizational approaches should be considered first and then training. On the other hand training programs will do no harm and can be endorsed in my opinion.

2. On the broader question of changing the Agency's outlook on problems of the future (paragraph 5) I again feel that the line-of-command approach is the only one that will produce results in a reasonable time and that Training simply reinforces the process by increasing the capacities of the individual analysts. In this respect I take a more restrictive view of OTR's proper function than does Hugh as an ex-Director, OTR. I do not think that the "Intelligence Institute" concept is the all-encompassing solution to redirection of thinking in the Agency; I particularly cannot see its benefit to DDS&T without in effect transplanting a sizeable amount of DDS&T blood into the Institute. Strictly from the DDS&T point of view, I think we are doing the job and can continue to do so

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
25X1 SUBJECT: Comments on [] Report on
Analyst Training

with assistance from OTR in specific instances. In other words I think we in DDS&T have the capacity to generate changes that are more apt to succeed than having the ideas developed outside and being given to us for implementation.

3. If in fact the Institute idea matures and officers are seconded from DDS&T, some incentive must be found for good people to serve there. Perhaps an in-grade for the duration of the tour; or, if the emphasis is to be on Agency-wide involvement, perhaps making a tour in the Institute a prerequisite for promotion of an analyst to, say GS-14 or 15.

4. With respect to paragraph 15 and speaking from the point of view of a line manager, I have some misgivings about the idea of having a number of separate centers in an Institute whence would come my guidance on how to analyze, how to use graphics and present my findings, or my ideas for work projects and the like. Again I feel that we do and can continue to do these things within the Directorate.

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KARL H. WEBER
Director
Scientific Intelligence

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DD/S&T# 3143-74/2

27 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DDS&T

SUBJECT: Comments on Interim Report on
Analyst Training

I have read the [] report with interest and sympathy. The goals they set and the ideas they have for upgrading the quality of training in the Agency make a good deal of sense. I would like to see the Agency go in that direction. However, I am a cynic and I suspect that there is neither the climate nor the budget available to support [] recommendations. I hope that history proves me to be wrong. So far as OTS is concerned, these recommendations have no great applicability. Virtually all of our training initiatives are concerned with highly specialized skills needed by our people. I assume this sort of training will go on regardless of whether the "Intelligence Institute" concept is implemented.

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David S. Brandwein
Director
Office of Technical Service

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Comments on [redacted] Memorandum, "Interim Report on Analyst Training"

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1. [redacted] seem to find the future of intelligence obscure and even frightening. They seem to think that "new methodologies" will be required to survive. They are much wiser than I am. I am not so bewildered. The more I dig into the history of the American intelligence profession, the more I become convinced that the basic objectives and methods of intelligence remain much the same. Some of the trappings may change; certainly some of the language changes; surely the technology changes. Nonetheless, I believe that we are still trying to learn the same things about the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of China, and all those recurrent hot spots and problems around the world that we have always been trying to find out. Quite simply, what resources do other people command and what are they planning to do with them that could help or hurt the United States? We seek these answers with a judicious mix of collection and analysis; a moving mix of men (persons) and machines. We set objectives and requirements. They remain unchanged whether we are in an era of confrontation or negotiation.

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2. It is a shame that [redacted] have not become aware of some intensive efforts inside the Agency to deal with the question of finite resources, including energy in all its forms. For 18 months, I shamelessly used the highly-expert resources of this Agency and produced studies on the implications of importing LNG from the Soviet Union, the feasibility of exploiting marginal energy reserves, the energy factor as it affected Latin America and the Far East. This same enterprise dealt with the critical factor of Arab politics in the energy situation and studied the implications of population growth, food supply, and the law of the sea. My point is that these are not new or neglected problems, and the substance is not all that difficult to master. Famine, droughts, drugs, and terror are not new, and I don't know what new methodologies are required, or what a different method of analyst training would contribute.

3. I have an equally reactionary view of estimates and the techniques of writing estimates. Except for the specialized NIE's which grow out of our prudent concern for the military

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factor in US-Soviet relations, all the estimates I have read have been highly inter-disciplinary experiences. Consider the estimates on the consequences of US actions against North Vietnam. By refusing to be bound by the equation that x number of bombs would subtract a measurable quantity from a finite economy and population, the estimators reached the correct conclusion that conventional warfare was no match for a will to fight using a primitive economy to support guerrilla warfare and subversion. In my opinion, you can't teach this as a technique. However, you can point with pride to this exercise as a case history for future analysts when they appear to be wandering into a narrow trap. We have produced many more right estimates than wrong ones. Our main problem has been and will be to get the right people to pay attention. (John A. McCone insisted, beyond the bounds of good manners, on presenting our most important estimates personally to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. He argued, in vain, that the National Security Council should be seized of national intelligence estimates and make policy decisions, as he did, based on intelligence findings.)

4. I maintain there is no magic formula for making an estimate and I regard estimating as unteachable. I maintain further that no one knows this better than [redacted] Consider the [redacted] method, both as he practiced it in producing world estimates and as he has modestly described it to me on several occasions, including those when I asked him to. You go off alone and steep yourself in the subject. You draft alone. You sit through coordinating meetings, yielding nothing on substance, staying alone and aloof. As required, you walk out, alone. There are other methods. They are collegial and coordinative. They will produce an estimate no better or no worse than that produced by the solipsistic [redacted]

5. How do you teach someone to conclude on the basis of no firm intelligence that the Soviet Union will place offensive missiles in Cuba? Probably by using the same technique which enabled the estimators to conclude correctly that the Soviet Union would not risk a general war over the issue of removing the missiles. At the risk of sounding even more cynical than Willard, my own experiences as an educator and educatee have

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led me to the conviction that the only people who can be taught to read, write, and think are those who are already able to read, write, and think. As for imparting that quality of intuitive hunching which is a hallmark of successful analysts I have known, the best we can do is point to where it worked in the past and hope that the maverick will not be ignored in the future.

25X1 6. [] offer two analogies which give me pause. One is to compare the analyst to a modern medical practitioner. Unless they are referring to low golf handicaps, I fail to grasp the connection. The other is to compare the Office of Training to a university. This, I think, demeans both parties. Mr. McCone and I once worked out an analogy between the whole Agency and a university. He told me that he had been approached about becoming chancellor of the University of California, and we agreed readily on two premises. One, he would run the university as he had the Agency. Second, a really great university was still a group of buildings adjacent to the sports palaces. The DD/I was the liberals arts faculty, who deplored the athletic program. All the members were brilliant prima donnas, and they certainly published so they would not perish. The DD/S was the buildings and grounds staff, whose primary mission was to maintain the sports palaces, oiling the turnstiles, printing and distributing game tickets. The DD/S&T had astounding theorists, who were all full professors with endowed chairs, and technicians who devised astounding gadgets. The theorists explained themselves to each other in esoteric terms. The gadget-lovers extracted huge sums of money from a bemused government on the grounds that the Soviets were about to leap-frog us. They never attended any games. The DD/P was the alumni association dedicated to the task of buying the best athletic teams money could buy. The aim was to field the best set of recruits who could beat the other team with no blood on any DD/P hands. A good DD/P would recruit a Moses Malone and get him through four years of eligibility and keep the NCAA at arms' length. Finally, a prime requirement for an ideal university is to have no students cluttering up the place. I doubt the Office of Training can meet these rigorous standards.

7. I do not see the need for an Intelligence Institute to replace the Office of Training. I doubt that Willard and Hugh intended to convey such an impression, but I can foresee an Intelligence Institute nurturing itself into a central

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focus, with training as the key function, and with the care and feeding of analysts as the major objective. Frankly, I think the analysts and collectors can better educate the Office of Training than the other way around. I think a judicious compilation of case studies in analysis of real problems would enable other analysts to benefit from these experiences, and I believe that the Office of Training can act as a very useful catalyst in this process.

8. I do not see the need for a great deal of soul searching about the immediate future. I think that the priority intelligence goals have been set out clearly for the collectors and analysts to see. Although it would help if the papers were written in English, the listings of priority national intelligence objectives and key intelligence questions provide more than enough guidance to collectors and analysts. If the analysts have a reasonable notion of what information and judgments are needed and by whom and for what purposes; if the systems managers understand the collection devices at their disposal and how they should be deployed; if these two conditions obtain, then I submit we are halfway home.

9. A fundamental condition in my book for training is that the analysts and the collectors must not be separated. We have a classic historical example of how to run the integrated intelligence process in the old Ad Hoc Requirements Committee and its successors. Here those with requirements sat with those who controlled the U-2's, and the most efficient use of the collection system was hammered out. What the analysts wanted to know resembled a Sears catalogue. The U-2 managers knew the limits of the aircraft and the camera. The arrangement worked because the collectors and analysts knew what they were after, and they knew the capabilities of the collection system.

10. Given my reactionary prejudices, I offer the following comments on the proposed six courses to teach basic skills.

(a) A survey of intelligence collection and processing should be preceded by a basic survey of the axioms of the intelligence process. How do we fix requirements? Do they come from the policy-maker, or are they self-generated? Can we satisfy requirements by overt means, by clandestine methods,

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by analysis, or by technology? What do we already know, and what more do we need to know? What resources does the intelligence community have? What do we do with our finished intelligence? Who gets it? Why?

(b) Only after we have surveyed the why should we move to the how, - in this case, the how of analysis. Here I fail to see the distinction between a course in estimating and a course in writing an intelligence estimate. Once the estimate is made, it must be set down (usually in writing) and conveyed. I consider it arbitrary to separate the two. I don't know why George Carver feels the need for a special course in writing estimates. If I know George, he can write them all himself.

(c)&(d) If you can write, you can write, be it an estimate or a report. To distinguish between writing a report or an estimate is to elevate one and to demean the other. It also gives writing as such a separate status which I do not accept. One thing worse than divorcing analysts from collectors is to separate technique from substance. In a generic sense, what we convey is written. I trust we are not persuaded that the medium is the message.

(e) Oral briefing is a black art, like putting. Some can; some can't. You teach it as you teach writing.

(f) The use of graphics? Why not?

11. If anyone wants to continue this discussion, let me offer my own basic skills course schedule.

(a) Survey of basic national security policies

(b) Resources and assigned responsibilities of the national intelligence community

(c) Mind-expanding seminar, using specific case histories of the roles played by intelligence collection and analysis in support of national security policies.

(d) Exercise in writing to identify those who can and those who can't.

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(e) Exercise in briefing, using graphics, to identify those who can and those who can't.

(f) Exercise in modern management techniques to identify those who can use them and those who can't. (The question of who can manage and who cannot is a separate one, and not to be assigned to training.)

(g) Periodic seminars on genuine current intelligence problems with the stipulation that collectors and analysts never sit down separately.

(h) Mind-expanding seminar on "new methodologies."
(Obviously, I should be the first to enroll in this course.)

12. Finally, I believe the Office of Training, under whatever name, can play a more useful role than it has in the past. It should continue to be a repository of wisdom gleaned from past experiences. It should continue to impart this wisdom to new generations and to develop and teach such doctrine and methodology as they have evolved and will continue to evolve. A new role, as I see it for training is to serve as a cutting edge in keeping abreast of educational methods and instructional techniques which will be conveyed to analysts and collectors along with the substance of the intelligence process. This should be a mind-expanding exercise for training, putting them in touch with those in government, in universities, and in business who are out of the frontiers. New techniques for conveying messages are most often found in conjunction with what are thought to be new problems and solutions; so there may be a bonus here. Basically, however, the content for a course in intelligence will not fluctuate much, and it should be governed by substance, not technique. I fear the elevation of training to a central function. I applaud any and all proposals which would enable us to learn more from the past to prevent similar mistakes in the future.



WALTER ELDER
Chief, CIA History Staff

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